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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between public capital expenditure and public debt in the 
European Union (EU) on a panel of fifteen countries over the sample period 1980-2013. We find 
robust evidence of a negative cointegrating relation, according to which increases in the capital 
expenditure-GDP ratio cause reductions in the debt-GDP ratio in the long run. Our empirical results 
suggest that current EU fiscal austerity can trigger upward debt spirals if cuts in total expenditure 
disregard its composition. Consistently with the “golden rule of public finance”, EU fiscal rules 
should allow for higher levels of capital expenditure in order to foster debt consolidation through 
growth dividends. 
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1. Introduction 
The European sovereign debt crisis of 2009-2012 has led to widespread concerns over the issue of 
fiscal sustainability in the European Union (EU). The austerity measures prescribed by the Fiscal 
Compact Treaty, in force since 2013, are regarded by a number of influential European policy 
makers as the most appropriate “exit strategy” to rule out explosive dynamics in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio. Fiscal retrenchment appears to be essential to guarantee debt consolidation and preserve 
governments’ solvency. In the present context, with a tax burden close to one half of GDP for 
several EU countries (Eurostat, 2014) and around the top of the “Laffer curve” (Trabandt and Uhlig, 
2011, 2012), expenditure cuts are periodically advocated in order for high debt-to-GDP ratios to 
embark on dynamic paths leading to the 60-percent Maastricht reference value. 
However, the composition of expenditure cuts may critically influence fiscal consolidation 
processes (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1997). In particular, fiscal adjustments characterized by 
permanent reductions in public capital expenditure to achieve budgetary targets may crowd out the 
economy’s rate of economic growth, consistently with both empirical evidence (Aschauer, 1989; 
Iwamoto, 1990; Barro, 1991; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993) and endogenous growth models (e.g., 
Futagami, Morita and Shibata, 1993), hence potentially deteriorating the long-run fiscal position 
(Yakita, 2008; Kondo, 2012). 
Along these lines, EU fiscal rules have historically been questioned since the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, for they abstract from the so-called “golden 
rule of public finance” which excludes public investments from the deficit ceiling (e.g., Modigliani 
et al., 1998; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2004). In the context of endogenous growth models with 
productive public capital, the golden rule is found to generate growth-enhancing effects with respect 
to fixed deficit rules in the spirit of the EU fiscal policy framework (Groneck, 2010). 
In this paper we analyze the dynamic relationship between public capital expenditure and 
public debt in the EU over the period from 1980 to 2013. We employ unit root and panel 
cointegration estimation methods, allowing for the possibility of endogenous structural breaks, to 
investigate the scope for convergent debt trajectories induced by fiscal stimulus aimed at enhancing 
public capital. Our empirical analysis is based on a panel of fifteen countries – EU(15) – which 
include members of the EU throughout the whole sample period 1980-2013 (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), 
countries which joined the EU during the 1980s and 1990s (Finland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain), 
and Norway, which is closely associated with the EU by its membership of the European Economic 
Area. We further concentrate on the GIIPS group of countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain), because of the alleged greater fragility of their public finances. 
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We find strong evidence of a significantly negative cointegrating relationship between 
public capital expenditure and public debt, evaluated in terms of ratios to GDP, in conjunction with 
a uni-directional causality whereby capital expenditure Granger-causes debt. These empirical 
findings apply both to EU(15) and to the subset of GIIPS countries. The evidence for a negative 
debt response to increases in capital expenditure shows extensive robustness especially from 1993 
to 2003, due to the occurrence of structural breaks in the individual series over the early 1990s, 
when the Maastricht Treaty was approved and entered into force.  
Our empirical results have two significant policy implications. First, the EU emphasis on 
reducing total public expenditure to sustain fiscal adjustments can be counter-productive, since it 
does not account for the critical link between the composition of public expenditure and the success 
of a fiscal consolidation plan. Secondly, permanent reductions in the debt-to-GDP ratio would 
require higher levels of capital expenditure, since they provide governments with “growth dividends” 
which reinforce the long-term stance of fiscal policy. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets forth the economic rationales behind the 
possible occurrence of a negative relationship between public capital expenditure and public debt. 
Section 3 presents the empirical results based on panel cointegration tests. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Capital expenditure and public debt sustainability 
Our central purpose in this paper is to infer the scope for strengthening the sustainability of EU 
public finances through rising public expenditure in assets, such as, for example, investments in 
technology and infrastructures. It is worth emphasizing that a negative relationship between public 
capital expenditure and public debt might occur, in theory, when one considers the variables either 
in levels at constant prices or as ratios to GDP. 
For real variables in levels, two opposite indirect mechanisms interact. On the one hand, 
higher public capital expenditure can enlarge the tax base, due to the implied fiscal stimulus on 
output (e.g., Tuladhar and Bruckner, 2010), thereby expanding fiscal revenues. On the other hand, 
higher public capital expenditure can increase the long-run real interest rate, due to the alleged rise 
in the marginal productivity of private capital (Bruce and Turnovsky, 1999; Groneck, 2010), thus 
exacerbating the debt service. A necessary condition for real debt to decline is that the first effect 
prevails on the second. 
For variables scaled by GDP, however, a third additional indirect mechanism is also at work. 
Consistently with the well-established literature mentioned in the Introduction, rising public capital 
expenditure induces an increase in the long-run growth rate, which per se tends to dampen the after-
growth real interest rate. It follows that, if the “growth dividend” is sufficiently pronounced to bring 
4 
 
about a negative after-growth real interest rate, the law of motion of the debt-to-GDP ratio turns to 
be fundamentally altered: intrinsically unstable dynamics are reversed into intrinsically stable 
dynamics. In this case, “honest” Ponzi games (Buiter, 1985) are even possible: deficits do not 
necessarily imply increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio, since they can always be financed by growth 
dividends (e.g., Bohn, 2008). 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Data 
This paper examines public capital expenditure and public debt over the period 1980-2013 and 
separately over the sub-periods 1980-1991 and 1993-2013, to consider the effects on fiscal policy of 
the Maastricht Treaty which was signed in 1992 and came into force in 1993. The data on public 
debt and public capital expenditure have been obtained from the AMECO (Annual Macroeconomic 
Data) database of the European Commission
1
. The general government public debt is here defined 
as the sum of all the internal liabilities of the central and regional governments. The variables have 
been considered both in real terms in 2005 prices, and as ratios to GDP at current market prices. All 
the data series have been transformed into logarithms in order to allow for possible non-linearities
2
 
and to achieve stationarity in variance. 
 Most countries in the sample experienced an increase in public debt and in public capital 
expenditure in real terms from 1980 to 2013. Since for most countries, however, the increase in 
capital expenditure was proportionally lower than the increase in public debt, capital expenditure 
also typically declined as a ratio to GDP. The correlation coefficient between public capital 
expenditure and debt is negative for almost all the countries in the sample, with the exceptions of 
Greece (0.62), Spain (0.41), UK (0.21), and the Netherlands (0.05). The largest negative 
correlations were experienced in Austria (-0.73), Italy (-0.68), and Portugal (-0.59). 
 Tables 1a and 1b report Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron (1988) and Kwiatkowsky, 
Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992) tests with a constant and trend for individual unit roots on the 
ratios of government debt and capital expenditure to GDP. The tests reject the null of non-
stationarity for variables (and vice versa in case of KPSS tests) in first differences for most of the 
countries in the sample. The ADF test cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the case of 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain, and the PP test cannot reject the null of a unit root for Italy 
and Spain. These results are in line with those reported by Afonso and Rault (2010) for the period 
1970-2006. The first difference of real public debt in Table 2a yields similar results, with the ADF 
test unable to reject the null of a unit root for Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway and Spain and the PP 
                                                          
1
 The Appendix lists all the variable definitions and their AMECO source codes. 
2
 See, e.g., Sarno (2001), Legrenzi and Milas (2013), and Piergallini and Postigliola (2013). 
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test unable to reject the null of non-stationarity for Spain only. The KPSS test supports the null of 
stationarity for all countries, for the above mentioned variables. For the capital expenditure-GDP 
ratio and the real capital expenditure series, all the three sets of test statistics confirm first-
difference stationarity for all the countries (the only exception being the PP test for real capital 
expenditure for Greece: see Table 2b). 
 Unit root tests therefore confirm that most of the variables under analysis can be regarded as 
stationary in first differences. Further analyses of the series however show that numerous series 
exhibited structural breaks over the sample period. We computed the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test 
for one unknown break point, and the Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) test for two structural breaks in 
level and trend. When one considers the common breaks for the two tests, structural breaks for the 
debt-GDP ratio are found for Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Spain in 1993-94, Finland, France 
and Italy in 1992-94, Germany in 1985-86, and Norway in 2002 (Table 3a). When one looks at the 
capital expenditure-GDP ratio, structural breaks can be seen for Denmark in 1993-94, Luxembourg 
in 1992, Ireland, Netherlands and Norway in 1991, France and Spain in 1989-90, Portugal in 1987, 
and UK in 1998 (Table 3b). A similar picture emerges from the analysis of the series in 2005 prices. 
Table 3c shows that a break was experienced in the real government debt series in Denmark and 
Finland in 1993-94, in Luxembourg and Norway in 1991, and in Germany in 1989. From Table 3d, 
the real expenditure series experienced structural breaks in Belgium and Luxembourg in 1991 and 
in Finland and Greece in 1986-88. 
 Most of the structural breaks therefore occurred during the period 1991-94, when the fiscal 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty came into force. This is relevant for policy analysis, since the 
resulting change in the fiscal regime could yield different long-run equilibrium relationships for the 
variables considered. No significant structural breaks were instead associated with the recent 2007-
08 financial crisis. 
 In addition to individual unit root tests, the panel unit root tests of Levin, Lin and Chu 
(2002), Breitung (2000), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), ADF-Fisher Chi-square, PP-Fisher Chi 
square, and Hadri (2000) were also implemented (Tables 4a and 4b). Most of these tests also 
confirm the stationarity of the first-differenced series, both for EU(15) and for the subset of GIIPS 
countries, with the only exceptions of the Hadri z-statistic for EU(15) and for GIIPS, and of the 
Breitung t-statistic for GIIPS. 
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3.2. Public capital expenditure and debt dynamics 
Table 5a presents the results of cointegration analysis between public capital expenditure and 
government debt for the panel of EU(15) countries over the sample period 1980-2013. The null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is tested both for the variables as ratios to GDP and for variables at 
constant prices. The Pedroni (1999, 2000, 2004) tests allow for heterogeneity across the individual 
members of the panel, and for both the long-run cointegrating vectors and the short-run dynamics. 
Seven statistics, four pooled (“within-dimension”) and three group-mean (“between-dimension”) 
are reported. The Fisher tests were proposed by Johansen (1998), and Maddala and Wu (1999). 
They apply Fisher’s (1932) meta-analysis approach to combine p-values from independent tests, 
with r being the number of cointegrating vectors under the null. The Kao (1999) test extends the 
Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) approach, under the assumption of strict 
exogeneity of the regressors with respect to the errors (see also Bhatt and Scaramozzino, 
forthcoming). 
The only evidence in favour of cointegration from Table 5a comes from the Fisher tests (r<0 
and r<1) and, for real variables, from the Pedroni (1999) panel v-statistic. The reason for the 
rejection of the cointegration relationship lies in the structural breaks in the individual series that 
occurred during the early 1990s which were discussed in section 3.1, and that took place around the 
time of the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. Tables 5b and 5c carry out the cointegration 
analysis separately for the sub-periods 1980-1991 and 1993-2013. There is weak evidence in favour 
of cointegration during the first sub-period. The Pedroni panel ADF-statistics and group ADF-
statistics and the Fisher tests all reject the null of no cointegration both for variables in ratios and at 
constant prices: for the former the null is also rejected by the Pedroni panel v-statistics and by the 
Kao (1999) test, whilst for the latter the null is also rejected by the Pedroni panel PP-statistic and 
the group PP-statistic. The summary results for the post-Maastricht sub-period 1993-2013 are 
presented in Table 5c. The evidence in favour of cointegration is now much stronger, with almost 
all tests (with the exception of the Pedroni panel v-statistics and group rho-statistics) supporting the 
existence of a long-run relationship between capital expenditures and debt. 
 Table 5d presents the results for the GIIPS countries over the whole sample period 1980-
2013. The evidence in favour of the existence of long-run equilibrium relationships for this sub-set 
of countries is only weak, with three tests supporting cointegration for the variables in ratios (the 
Pedroni panel ADF-statistic and the two Fisher tests) and with five tests supporting cointegration 
for the variables at constant prices (the Pedroni group ADF-statistic and the Kao test, in addition to 
the previous three tests). The evidence in favour of cointegration is however much stronger over the 
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more recent sub-period 1993-2013. Table 5e shows that nine out of ten tests are significant for 
variables in levels, and five out of ten for variables as ratios to GDP. 
 Table 6 shows Kao’s (1999) Fully-Modified OLS coefficients for EU(15) and for the GIIPS 
countries. The coefficients describe the long-run relationship between the cointegrating variables. 
The coefficients are negative across all the specifications and the sample periods considered. Their 
values are always highly significant for the variables as ratios to GDP. The only exception is for 
GIIPS countries over the post-Maastricht period 1993-2013. When the relationship between the 
variables is estimated at constant prices, the negative coefficient is only significant for the whole 
sample of fifteen EU countries for the sub-period 1980-1991 and for the GIIPS countries over 1993-
2013. This suggests, as the discussion of Section 2 indicates, that the “growth dividend” is likely to 
constitute the main channel through which higher capital expenditure strengthens fiscal 
consolidation. Such a channel explains transparently why higher values of public capital 
expenditure tend to be associated with systematically lower levels of government debt when the 
variables are evaluated as ratios to GDP and not at constant prices. 
 Table 7a presents the results of Granger-causality tests on the direction of the relationship 
between capital expenditure and debt. Capital expenditure always Granger-causes public debt, both 
as a ratio to GDP and at constant prices. By contrast, there is no evidence that debt Granger-causes 
real capital expenditure when the variables are expressed as ratios to GDP but only when they are 
measured in levels. The inconclusive result for real series, unscaled by GDP, reinforces the view 
that higher capital expenditure triggers convergent paths for the debt to GDP ratio primarily because 
it tends, per se, to reduce the after-growth real interest rate. 
 Table 7b presents the Granger-causality results for the GIIPS group of countries. Capital 
expenditure is strongly confirmed to help predict public debt. The effects of public debt on capital 
expenditure are now weaker. 
 Taken in conjunction with the results from Table 6, the Granger-causality tests from Tables 
7a and 7b show that higher public capital expenditure tends to be associated with lower, and not 
with higher, public debt for the sample of countries considered in the analysis. These results are 
especially important in the light of the current policy debate on the most effective measures to take 
in order to achieve fiscal consolidation in the European Union. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Whereas EU fiscal austerity measures aim to guarantee debt consolidation in the aftermath of the 
sovereign debt crisis of 2009-2012, this paper provides direct evidence of the stabilizing effects 
induced by expansions in public capital expenditure. Increases in the ratio of capital expenditure to 
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GDP cause reductions in the ratio of debt to GDP in the long run. This empirical finding emerges 
from panel cointegration analysis applied to fifteen EU countries and to the subset of GIIPS 
countries over the sample period from 1980 to 2013, and appears particularly pronounced over the 
period from 1993 to 2013. 
Therefore, the paper confirms that “fiscal discipline” may be conceptually different from 
“fiscal austerity”: fiscal discipline does not necessarily require expenditure-based fiscal austerity. 
The paper’s results are consistent with the view that the EU fiscal consolidation process should 
explicitly control for the composition of public expenditure. Rising public investment stimulates the 
long-run rate of economic growth and thus fosters convergence in debt-GDP ratios, ruling out the 
possible occurrence of high debt-austerity traps.  
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Appendix. Variables definitions and sources. 
 
 
 
Original Series AMECO codes
 
General Government consolidated gross debt, 
Excessive Deficit procedure (based on ESA 
1995) and former definition (linked series) 
(% of GDP) 
UDGGL 
UDGGF 
General Government debt (level) UDGGL 
UDGGF 
General Government capital expenditure UIGG 
UKOG 
Gross Domestic Product (current prices)  UVGD 
GDP Deflator PVGD 
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Table 1a. Stationarity Tests for the First Difference of Government Debt to GDP
1
. 
 
  ADF ADF PP
2
 PP
2 
KPSS 
 Country Period t-stat P-value t-stat P-value LM-Statistic 
For level 
Stationarity
c 
       
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-3.310 
-3.033 
-3.237 
-3.792 
-3.529 
0.0227 
0.0424 
0.0269 
0.0072 
0.0135 
-3.035 
-2.995 
-3.147 
-2.656 
-3.442 
0.0422 
0.0460  
0.0330 
0.0926 
0.0166 
0.355601
*** 
0.378097
***
 
0.228541
*** 
0.081416
***
  
0.155890
*** 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
1980-2013  
1980-2013 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-4.150 
-5.411 
-1.879 
-2.557 
-1.676 
0.0028 
0.0001 
0.3373 
0.1121 
0.4326 
-4.484 
-5.412 
-1.963 
-2.557 
-4.703 
0.0012 
0.0001 
0.0488 
0.1121 
0.0007 
0.151124
*** 
0.163692
*** 
0.226473
*** 
0.183831
*** 
0.500688
* 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-3.217 
-4.778 
-2.864 
-2.155 
-2.574  
0.0281 
0.0005 
0.0608 
0.2257  
0.1088 
-3.116 
-4.762 
-2.871 
-2.204 
-1.832 
0.0353 
0.0006 
0.0599 
0.2085 
0.0643 
0.196689
*** 
0.163463
*** 
0.303228
*** 
0.132496
*** 
0.373120
*** 
 
Notes: 
1. The null hypothesis of all tests is that the series has a unit root except for the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
tests, where the null hypothesis is stationarity around a constant. The lag length in the ADF regression is based on 
the Schwartz Information criterion with a maximum lag of 7.  
2. Bandwidth: Newey-West using a Bartlett Kernel. 
3. The critical values provided by Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1) are respectively 0.739 (1 per 
cent level), 0.463 (5 per cent level) and 0.347 (10 per cent level) for the LM test for level stationarity. 
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Table 1b. Stationarity Tests for the First Difference of General Government Capital 
Expenditure to GDP
1
. 
 
  ADF ADF PP
2
 PP
2 
KPSS 
 Country Period t-stat P-value t-stat P-value 
For 
Adj-t-stat 
LM-Statistic 
For level 
Stationarity
c 
       
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-6.7800 
-12.129 
-3.2646 
-5.9001 
-6.3516 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0256 
0.0000 
0.0000 
-14.775 
-11.773 
-6.4001 
-7.0531 
-6.5316 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.081832
*** 
0.256586
*** 
0.180110
*** 
0.176219
*** 
0.075324
*** 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1990-2013  
-6.6183 
-2.1443 
-4.4064 
-9.5802 
-7.1815  
0.0000 
0.0327 
0.0016 
0.0000 
0.0000 
-14.621 
-2.0848 
-12.578 
-10.239 
-7.3456 
0.0000 
0.0374 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.484848
** 
0.210071
*** 
0.245524
*** 
0.113081
*** 
0.120760
*** 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-8.7231 
-4.6389 
-6.5228 
-8.3192 
-7.0340 
0.0000 
0.0008 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
-21.591 
-4.8908 
-11.030 
-8.7200 
-7.4641 
0.0001 
0.0004 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.500000
* 
0.083621
*** 
0.500000
* 
0.344715
*** 
0.096420
*** 
 
Notes: 
1. The null hypothesis of all tests is that the series has a unit root except for the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
tests, where the null hypothesis is stationarity around a constant. The lag length in the ADF regression is based on 
the Schwartz Information criterion with a maximum lag of 7.  
2. Bandwidth: Newey-West using a Bartlett Kernel. 
3. The critical values provided by Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1) are respectively 0.739 (1 per 
cent level), 0.463 (5 per cent level) and 0.347 (10 per cent level) and 0.347 (10 per cent level) for the LM test for 
level stationarity. 
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Table 2a. Stationarity Tests for the First Difference of Real Government Debt 
(2005 prices)
1
. 
 
  ADF ADF PP
2 
PP
2 
KPSS 
 Country Period t-stat P-value Adj-t-stat 
 
P-value 
For 
Adj-t-stat 
LM-Statistic 
For level 
Stationarity
c 
       
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-3.9255 
-2.0227 
-3.5002 
-3.4115 
-3.5007 
0.0051 
0.0538 
0.0148 
0.0188 
0.0145 
-3.6762 
-2.8282 
-2.5832 
-2.6301 
-3.5396 
0.0095 
0.0656 
0.1068 
0.0976  
0.0132 
0.080606
*** 
0.389174
** 
0.260809
*** 
0.089390
*** 
0.402596
** 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-4.5331 
-6.4281 
-1.8924 
-4.3926 
-1.5808 
0.0010 
0.0000 
0.3315 
0.0015 
0.4801 
-4.3658 
-8.1481 
-1.5615 
-4.3926 
-5.4604 
0.0016 
0.0000 
0.1097 
0.0015 
0.0001 
0.146644
*** 
0.500000
* 
0.313943
***
  
0.270087
***
  
0.565418
*
  
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-4.6455 
-1.8674 
-2.6357 
-2.0017 
-3.5236 
0.0008 
0.3424 
0.0965 
0.2847 
0.0137 
-4.6931 
-5.3978 
-2.7055 
-2.0651 
-3.5236 
0.0007 
0.0001 
0.0841 
0.2593 
0.0137 
0.188150
*** 
0.122461
*** 
0.441240
**
  
0.184810
***
  
0.451746
* 
  
 
Notes: 
 
1. The null hypothesis of all tests is that the series has a unit root except for the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
tests, where the null hypothesis is stationarity around a constant. The lag length in the ADF regression is based on 
the Schwartz Information criterion with a maximum lag of 7.  
2. Bandwidth: Newey-West using a Bartlett Kernel. 
3. The critical values provided by Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1) are respectively 0.739 (1 per 
cent level), 0.463 (5 per cent level) and 0.347 (10 per cent level) and 0.347 (10 per cent level) for the LM test for 
level stationarity.  
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Table 2b. Stationarity Tests for First Difference of Real General Government Capital 
  Expenditure (2005 prices)
1
. 
 
  ADF ADF PP
2
 PP
2 
KPSS 
 Country Period t-stat P-value Adj t-stat P-value 
For 
Adj-t-stat 
LM-Statistic 
For level 
Stationarity
c 
       
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-7.3831 
-11.522 
-3.8478 
-6.3081 
-5.6303 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0063 
0.0000 
0.0001 
-19.8953 
-12.1726 
-7.22843 
-11.8476 
-5.64020 
0.0001  
0.0000  
0.0000  
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.064667
*** 
0.500000
* 
0.452421
** 
0.385399
**
  
0.074498
***
  
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1990-2013  
-6.6230 
-3.7544 
-4.3360 
-9.1403 
-7.6925 
0.0000 
0.0081 
0.0019 
0.0000 
0.0000 
-12.8462 
-1.35829 
-11.7875 
-9.20968 
-7.99947 
0.0000 
0.5899 
0.0000  
0.0000 
0.0000  
0.349670
** 
0.251300
*** 
0.204542
*** 
0.155646
*** 
0.127239
***
  
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
1980-2013  
-8.4787 
-5.2641 
-5.8324 
-8.8622 
-6.7754 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000  
-21.2927 
-6.81477 
-6.35522 
-8.88172 
-7.17743 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000  
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.500000
* 
0.120693
*** 
0.339881
*** 
0.300629
***
  
0.088329
*** 
 
Notes: 
1. The null hypothesis of all tests is that the series has a unit root except for the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
tests, where the null hypothesis is stationarity around a constant. The lag length in the ADF regression is based on 
the Schwartz Information criterion with a maximum lag of 7.  
2. Bandwidth: Newey-West using a Bartlett Kernel c-The critical values provided by Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin (1992, Table 1) are respectively 0.739 (1 per cent level), 0.463 (5 per cent level) and 0.347 (10 per cent level) 
and 0.347 (10 per cent level) for the LM test for level stationarity. 
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Table 3a. Tests for Structural Change in the First Difference of Government Debt to GDP 
  (1980-2013). 
 
                               Zivot  and Andrews (1992)       Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) 
   
Country         Lags      t-stat
a 
Break 
date 
Break 
Date 
TB1 
Break 
Date 
TB2 
tstat
b
-
value 
TB1 
t
b
-stat 
value 
TB2
 
p
b
-
value 
TB1 
p
b
-
value 
TB2
 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
-3.6594
** 
-3.1389
*** 
-4.0929
** 
-5.4080
*** 
-3.6670
* 
2000 
2008 
2000 
1991 
2006 
1994
 
1994 
1994 
1993 
1993 
2010 
2009 
2006
 
2010 
2007 
-1.9191 
-5.8552 
-6.1490 
-4.7446 
  2.0525 
0.2326 
2.9855 
5.7225 
2.2642 
3.4742 
0.0675 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0517 
0.8181 
0.0066 
0.0000 
0.0333 
0.0021 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
-4.8710
*** 
-2.6030
 
-3.8928 
-2.3946
 
-3.0290
*** 
1995 
2006 
2004 
1991 
2008 
1985 
2009
 
1992 
1993 
1989 
1996
 
2011 
2006 
2007 
2007 
  2.7340 
  1.5846 
 -5.1844 
 -2.6397 
  0.4701 
1.9844 
-1.930 
5.2778 
3.6837 
4.9130 
0.0118 
0.1267 
0.0000 
0.0146 
0.6427 
0.0637 
0.0660 
0.0000 
0.0012 
0.0001 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-3.3963
*** 
-5.5293
*** 
-3.6745 
-1.9903 
-5.0691 
2008 
2006 
2007 
1992 
2005 
 
1998 
2002 
1999 
1994 
1989 
2009 
2007
 
2008
 
2008 
2007 
 -1.6440 
  2.7332 
  3.6383 
 -6.2767 
  0.5400 
1.3852 
-4.365 
4.4095 
6.8603 
3.9079 
0.1138 
0.0108 
0.0014
0.0000 
0.5943 
0.1793 
0.0002 
0.0002 
0.0000 
0.0007 
 
 
Notes: 
1. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Zivot and Andrews (1992, p.262) and are respectively -6.68 (1 per cent level), -5.82 (5 per cent level) 
and -5.37 (10 per cent level). 
2. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), and are respectively -8.78 (1 per cent level), -7.47 (5 per cent level) 
and -6.98 (10 per cent level). 
3. *** denotes statistical significance at 1 per cent level of significance, ** denotes statistical significance of the 
structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance while * denotes statistical significance of the structural break 
at the 10 per cent level of significance. 
4. The Zivot and Andrews test for structural breaks identifies a single possible break in the series. Instead, the 
Lumsdaine and Papell test identifies two possible breaks. We consider a break in the series to be binding, only 
when the same break is found in both the tests and are significant. 
5. In case of the debt/GDP values for each country, it can be seen that common breaks from the test are found in case 
of Austria for 1993-94, 1992-1994 for Denmark, 1995-96 for Germany, 1992 for Italy, 1994-1997 for Norway. 
Since, the common break period is early 1990s we can conclude that in general, a break in the panel of the 
countries altogether would be between 1992-1994.  
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Table 3b. Tests for Structural Change in the Ratio of General Government Capital 
  Expenditure to GDP (1980-2013). 
 
                                                   Zivot   and Andrews (1992)                  Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) 
Country         Lags                     t-stat Break 
date 
Break 
date 1 
Break 
date 2 
t-stat 
TB1 
t-stat 
TB2 
P-
value 1 
P-value 
2
b 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
0 
1 
4 
0 
0 
-7.1243
*** 
-4.4639
 
-2.9300 
-5.1887
*** 
-4.7843
*** 
2004 
1989 
2005 
1997 
1996 
1986 
1986 
1993 
1996 
1989 
2005 
1991 
2007 
2001 
1997 
-4.217 
-2.719 
-1.662 
-4.959 
 1.435 
1.432 
2.753 
3.228 
4.854 
-1.09 
0.0003 
0.0122 
0.1099 
0.0001 
0.1646 
0.1656 
0.0113 
0.0037 
0.0001 
0.2852 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
-6.4900
** 
-2.6298
 
-5.1135
** 
-3.3014
** 
-4.3567
** 
1997 
1990 
2008 
2003 
1988 
1996
 
1989 
1991 
1987
 
1992 
2002
 
2011 
2007 
2004 
2003 
-10.64 
 0.225 
 3.901 
-3.081 
-2.514 
10.04 
6.499 
3.713 
-0.88 
0.397 
0.0000 
0.8238 
0.0051 
0.0053 
0.0194 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0011 
0.3841 
0.6947 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
-5.7229
 
-4.0452
** 
-4.8730
* 
-3.8449
* 
-4.2797
*** 
1997 
1995 
1996 
1990 
2008 
1991 
1991 
1987 
1990 
1998 
1999 
2005
 
2003
 
2010 
2009 
 0.936 
-3.827 
 3.653 
1.540 
2.332 
-0.33 
3.392 
-3.99 
-2.89 
-3.47 
0.3588 
0.0009 
0.0013 
0.1372 
0.0288 
0.7380 
0.0025 
0.0006 
0.0082 
0.0021 
 
Notes: 
1. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Zivot and Andrews (1992, p.262) and are respectively -6.68 (1 per cent level), -5.82 (5 per cent level) 
and -5.37 (10 per cent level). 
2. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), and are respectively -8.78 (1 per cent level), -7.47 (5 per cent level) 
and -6.98 (10 per cent level). 
3. *** denotes statistical significance at 1 per cent level of significance, ** denotes statistical significance of the 
structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance while * denotes statistical significance of the structural break 
at the 10 per cent level of significance. 
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Table 3c. Tests for Structural Change in the Real Government Debt (2005 prices) 
(1980-2013). 
 
                                    Zivot   and Andrews (1992)                  Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) 
Country         Lags      t-stat
a 
Break 
date 
Break 
Date 
TB1 
Break 
Date 
TB2 
t-stat 
value 
TB1 
t-stat 
value 
TB2 
P
b
-
value 
TB1 
P
b
-value 
TB2
 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-3.8902
*** 
-2.4078
 
-4.5065
** 
-4.7388
*** 
-3.5718
* 
2003 
1986 
1992 
1992 
2006 
1986
 
1997 
1993 
1993 
1987 
2006 
2009 
2006
 
2008 
2007 
  2.994 
-2.3071 
-4.8036 
  0.616 
  4.744 
2.3008 
0.0002 
4.9997 
5.3566 
4.2496 
0.0065 
0.0304 
0.0001 
0.5434 
0.0001 
0.0308 
0.9998 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0003 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
-3.2524
* 
-3.9735
 
-4.3959
** 
-3.4914
** 
-3.9676
* 
1994 
1988 
2005 
1993 
2005 
1989 
1986
 
1991 
1985 
1991 
2002
 
2007 
2007 
1994 
2008 
  3.781 
  4.617 
-3.085 
 3.1943 
 7.0824 
-0.4786 
 3.8536 
 5.5887 
-2.5470 
 7.5902 
0.0010 
0.0001 
0.0052 
0.0040 
0.0000 
0.6367 
0.0008 
0.0000 
0.0180 
0.0000 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
-2.0787
** 
-3.6941
** 
-5.1974
* 
-2.4698
** 
-3.9409
 
2000 
2006 
2006 
2005 
2007 
 
2001 
1991 
1985 
1994 
1996 
2009 
2007
 
2007
 
2008 
2008 
 1.1618 
 3.4792 
3.9074 
-2.7135 
1.1664 
-0.9587 
-4.7617 
 4.4516 
5.5433 
5.1322 
0.1192 
0.0020 
0.0007 
0.0124 
0.2554 
0.3476 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0000 
0.0000 
 
Notes: 
1. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Zivot and Andrews (1992, p.262) and are respectively -6.68 (1 per cent level), -5.82 (5 per cent level) 
and -5.37 (10 per cent level). 
2. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), and are respectively -8.78 (1 per cent level), -7.47 (5 per cent level) 
and -6.98 (10 per cent level). 
3. *** denotes statistical significance at 1 per cent level of significance, ** denotes statistical significance of the 
structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance while * denotes statistical significance of the structural break 
at the 10 per cent level of significance. 
4. The Zivot and Andrews test for structural breaks identifies a single possible break in the series. Instead, the 
Lumsdaine and Papell test identifies two possible breaks. We consider a break in the series to be binding only 
when the same break is found in both the tests and are significant. 
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Table 3d. Tests for Structural Change in the Real General Government Capital 
 Expenditure (2005 prices) (1980-2013). 
 
                                                   Zivot and Andrews (1992)                  Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) 
Country         Lags                     t-stat Break 
date 
Break 
date 1 
Break 
date 2 
t-stat 
DT1 
t-stat 
DT2 
P-value 
DT1 
P-value 
DT2
b 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
-7.7396
*** 
-4.6341
 
-2.9249 
-6.1481 
-3.5833
*** 
2004 
1989 
2006 
1997 
1996 
1994 
1986 
1993 
1985 
1989 
2005 
1991 
2008 
1998
 
1997 
-4.795 
-1.909 
  0.686 
  4.000 
  2.308 
 3.195 
 2.262 
 3.249 
-2.384 
-0.987 
0.0001 
0.0687 
0.4992 
0.0006 
0.0303 
0.0040 
0.0334 
0.0035 
0.0257 
0.3338 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
 
2 
1 
0 
1 
0 
-6.5608
** 
-4.3751
 
-5.1976
*** 
-3.2380
** 
-5.6460
*** 
1997 
1990 
2008 
2006 
2002 
1996
 
1988 
1996 
1998
 
1991 
2002
 
1995 
2008 
2007 
2003 
-7.907 
 2.885 
 4.924 
 2.416 
2.190 
 
 7.586 
-2.015 
 4.219 
-3.917 
-1.754 
0.0000 
0.0083 
0.0001 
0.0240 
0.0389 
0.0000 
0.0557 
0.0003 
0.0007 
0.0927 
 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
-5.5445
** 
-4.1621
** 
-4.0254
* 
-4.1413
*** 
-4.6761
*** 
2008 
2000 
1997 
2008 
2008 
1996 
1988 
1987 
1986 
2001 
2002 
2002
 
2003
 
2009 
2009 
-3.904 
 3.224 
 5.666 
2.977 
5.1873 
4.6038 
1.2484 
-5.371 
-4.393 
-6.193 
0.0007 
0.0194 
0.0000 
0.0067 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.2244 
0.0000 
0.0002 
0.0000 
 
Notes: 
1. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Zivot and Andrews (1992, p.262) and are respectively -6.68 (1 per cent level), -5.82 (5 per cent level) 
and -5.37 (10 per cent level). 
2. The exact critical values are calculated are calculated based on 7,000 replications of a Monte Carlo simulation as 
described in Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), and are respectively -8.78 (1 per cent level), -7.47 (5 per cent level) 
and -6.98 (10 per cent level). 
3. *** denotes statistical significance at 1 per cent level of significance, ** denotes statistical significance of the 
structural break at the 5 per cent level of significance while * denotes statistical significance of the structural break 
at the 10 per cent level of significance. 
4. The Zivot and Andrews test for structural breaks identifies a single possible break in the series. Instead, the 
Lumsdaine and Papell test identifies two possible breaks. We consider a break in the series to be binding only 
when the same break is found in both the tests and are significant. 
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Table 4a. Panel Unit Root Tests (EU(15)) (1980-2013). 
 
 
Panel Data  Levin, 
Lin & 
Chu 
Breitung 
t-stat
 
Im, Pesaran 
and Shin  
W-stat 
ADF - 
Fisher  
Chi-
square 
PP - Fisher 
Chi-square 
Hadri  
Z-stat 
Government 
Debt/GDP 
 
Capital 
expenditure/ 
GDP 
-5.9935 
(0.0000) 
 
-6.72257 
(0.0000) 
 
-3.78995 
(0.0001) 
 
-1.96109 
(0.0249) 
 
-5.9435 
(0.0000) 
 
-12.7160 
(0.0000) 
93.3359 
(0.0000)
 
 
196.794 
(0.0000) 
117.632 
(0.0000) 
 
1882.22 
(0.0000) 
7.68810 
(0.0000) 
 
8.78881 
(0.0000) 
 
Real 
Debt 
 
Real Capital 
Expenditure 
 
-4.99982 
(0.0000) 
 
-7.05209 
(0.0000) 
 
-2.92713 
(0.0017) 
 
-2.30042 
(0.0107) 
 
-4.45810 
(0.0000) 
 
-13.0893 
(0.0000) 
 
72.2731 
(0.0001) 
 
200.281 
(0.0000) 
 
331.086 
(0.0001) 
 
1534.26 
(0.0000) 
 
5.38560 
(0.0000) 
 
7.12414 
(0.0000) 
 
 
Notes: 
 
1. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi–square distribution. 
2. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
3. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC, Newey-West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett Kernel. 
4. Ten cross-sections used in each test. The Levin, Lin & Chu t test uses 290 observations, Breitung-stat used 280 
observations, Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat, ADF-Fischer chi square used 290 observations, PP-Fischer chi-square 
used 300 observations. Finally, Hadri-z stat used 310 observations. Hadri z-stat assumes no unit root in the process 
while the other tests assume unit root as the null. 
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Table 4b. Panel Unit Root Tests (GIIPS) (1980-2013). 
 
 
Panel Data  Levin, 
Lin & 
Chu 
Breitung t-
stat
 
Im, Pesaran 
and Shin  
W-stat 
ADF - 
Fisher Chi-
square 
PP - Fisher 
Chi-square 
Hadri Z-
stat 
 
Government 
Debt/GDP 
 
Capital 
expenditure/ 
GDP 
 
-1.07939 
(0.1402) 
 
-6.67648 
(0.0000) 
 
 
-1.09468 
(0.1368) 
 
1.67924 
(0.9534) 
 
-1.97301 
(0.0242) 
 
-11.1846 
(0.0000) 
 
19.1127 
(0.0389)
 
 
119.950 
(0.0000) 
 
34.1077 
(0.0002) 
 
698.408 
(0.0000) 
 
4.9985 
(0.0000) 
 
5.09028 
(0.0000) 
 
Real 
Debt 
 
Real Capital 
Expenditure 
 
-2.33511 
(0.0098) 
 
-2.98446 
(0.0014) 
 
-0.98982 
(0.1611) 
 
 1.69503 
 (0.9550) 
 
-3.92859 
(0.0000) 
 
-9.52363 
(0.0000) 
 
35.1202 
(0.0001) 
 
107.903 
(0.0000) 
 
241.643 
(0.0000) 
 
255.636 
(0.0000) 
 
3.14924 
(0.0008) 
 
0.72744 
(0.2335) 
 
Notes: 
 
1. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi–square distribution. 
2. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
3. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC, Newey-West bandwidth selection using a Bartlett Kernel. 
4. Ten cross-sections used in each test. The Levin, Lin & Chu t test uses 290 observations, Breitung-stat used 280 
observations, Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat, ADF-Fischer chi square used 290 observations, PP-Fischer chi-square 
used 300 observations. Finally, Hadri-z stat used 310 observations. Hadri z-stat assumes no unit root in the process 
while the other tests assume unit root as the null. 
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Table 5a. Summary Panel Cointegration (EU15) (1980-2013). 
 
Variables 
 
Pedroni 
(panel 
v-statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Fisher 
(r < 0) 
Fisher 
(r < 1) 
Kao 
 
Govt 
Debt/GDP 
& Capital 
Exp/GDP 
 
0.895 
(0.18) 
 
0.9499 
(0.828) 
 
0.2312 
(0.5914) 
 
-0.2920 
(0.385) 
 
2.3485 
(0.990) 
 
1.6032 
(0.9456)  
 
-0.0882 
(0.4648) 
 
82.51 
(0.0000) 
 
53.91 
(0.0047) 
 
- 0.79935 
  (0.2120) 
Real Debt 
& Real 
Capital 
Exp 
 
4.220 
(0.00) 
 
0.9855 
(0.837) 
 
0.4723 
(0.6817) 
 
-0.4689 
(0.319) 
 
2.3022 
(0.989) 
 
1.8367 
(0.9666) 
 
0.0870 
(0.5347) 
 
78.62 
(0.0000) 
 
47.21 
(0.0237) 
 
1.17574 
(0.1198) 
 
 
 
Table 5b. Summary Panel Cointegration (EU15) (1980-1991). 
 
Variables 
 
Pedroni 
(panel 
v-statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Fisher 
(r < 0) 
Fisher 
(r < 1) 
Kao 
 
Govt 
Debt/GDP 
& Capital 
Exp/GDP 
 
3.859 
(0.00) 
 
2.4923 
(0.993) 
 
0.9952 
(0.8402) 
 
-1.2885 
(0.098) 
 
3.2770 
(0.999) 
 
0.57523 
(0.7174) 
 
-1.2984 
(0.0971) 
 
104.6 
(0.0000) 
 
80.84 
(0.0000) 
 
- 1.97613 
  (0.0241) 
Real Debt 
& Real 
Capital 
Exp 
 
-0.55 
(0.71) 
 
0.3344 
(0.631) 
 
-1.46686 
(0.0710) 
 
-1.5777 
(0.057) 
 
0.8666 
(0.806) 
 
-2.2845 
(0.0112) 
 
-1.47708 
(0.0698) 
 
63.66 
(0.0003) 
 
54.32 
(0.0042) 
 
-1.0301 
(0.1515) 
 
 
 
 
Table 5c. Summary Panel Cointegration (EU15) (1993-2013). 
 
Variables 
 
Pedroni 
(panel 
v-statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Fisher 
(r < 0) 
Fisher 
(r < 1) 
Kao 
 
Govt 
Debt/GDP 
& Capital 
Exp/GDP 
 
-1.65 
(0.95) 
 
-6.4283 
(0.000) 
 
-5.28514 
(0.0000) 
 
-4.9892 
(0.000) 
 
-0.7070 
(0.239) 
 
-1.9546 
(0.0253) 
 
-3.16317 
(0.008) 
 
82.48 
(0.0000) 
 
53.93 
(0.0047) 
 
- 1.9864 
  (0.0235) 
Real Debt 
& Real 
Capital 
Exp 
 
-1.57 
(0.94) 
 
-7.2239 
(0.000) 
 
-5.65661 
(0.0000) 
 
-5.6208 
(0.000) 
 
-0.5475 
(0.292) 
 
-1.5739 
(0.0577) 
 
-2.21056 
(0.0135) 
 
59.66 
(0.0010) 
 
41.40 
(0.0804) 
 
1.78673 
(0.0370) 
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Table 5d. Summary Panel Cointegration (GIIPS) (1980-2013). 
 
Variables 
 
Pedroni 
(panel 
v-statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Fisher 
(r < 0) 
Fisher 
(r < 1) 
Kao 
 
Govt 
Debt/GDP 
& Capital 
Exp/GDP 
 
0.373 
(0.35) 
 
-0.8643 
(0.139) 
 
-0.9028 
(0.1833) 
 
-1.4305 
(0.076) 
 
0.2890 
(0.613) 
 
-0.1579 
(0.4372) 
 
0.1011 
(0.5403) 
 
35.23 
(0.0001) 
 
20.76 
(0.0228) 
 
- 0.93003 
  (0.1762) 
Real Debt 
& Real 
Capital 
Exp 
 
0.535 
(0.29) 
 
-0.329 
(0.370) 
 
0.1816 
(0.5721) 
 
-0.4689 
(0.077) 
 
1.3895 
(0.917) 
 
1.6186 
(0.9472) 
 
-1.5084 
(0.0657) 
 
16.92 
(0.0076) 
 
26.39 
(0.0032) 
 
1.75481 
(0.0396) 
 
 
 
Table 5e. Summary Panel Cointegration (GIIPS) (1993-2013). 
 
Variables 
 
Pedroni 
(panel 
v-statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(panel 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
rho- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
pp- 
statistic) 
Pedroni 
(group 
ADF- 
statistic) 
Fisher 
(r < 0) 
Fisher 
(r < 1) 
Kao 
 
Govt 
Debt/GDP 
& Capital 
Exp/GDP 
 
-0.7738 
(0.7805) 
 
-1.7143 
(0.0432) 
 
-1.0735 
(0.1415) 
 
-1.8474 
(0.0323) 
 
0.7530 
(0.7743) 
 
0.8362 
(0.7985) 
 
-1.9395 
(0.0262) 
 
62.75 
(0.0000) 
 
16.48 
(0.0867) 
 
 1.0130 
(0.1555) 
Real Debt 
& Real 
Capital 
Exp 
 
1.4033 
(0.0803) 
 
-2.1141 
(0.0172) 
 
-2.3045 
(0.0106) 
 
-3.8065 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.7728 
(0.2198) 
 
-1.4516 
(0.0733) 
 
-3.8282 
(0.0001) 
 
38.03 
(0.0002) 
 
19.56 
(0.0337) 
 
-3.1301 
(0.0009) 
 
Note: 
 
p-values in brackets. 
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Table 6. Summary Panel Cointegration (1980-2013) – Kao FMOLS Coefficients. 
 
Variables EU(15) 
(1980-2013) 
EU(15) 
(1980-1991) 
 
EU(15) 
(1993-2013) 
GIIPS 
(1980-2013) 
GIIPS 
(1993-2013) 
Govt Debt/GDP & 
Capital 
Expenditure/GDP 
 
 
-0.04818 
(0.0001) 
 
-0.16979 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.15859 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.07169 
(0.0062) 
 
-0.02971 
(0.4502) 
 
Real Debt & Real 
Capital 
Expenditure 
 
 
-0.03001 
(0.1614) 
 
-0.17483 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.03737 
(0.1863) 
 
-0.03002 
(0.2441) 
 
-0.5789 
(0.0000) 
 
Note: 
 
p-values in brackets. 
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Table 7a. Granger Causality Test EU(15) Panel. 
 
Panel Data (EU15) F-statistic 
(1980-2013) 
F-statistic 
(1993-2013) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Capital 
Expenditure/GDP does not 
Granger Cause Debt/GDP 
 
 
3.69729 
(0.0255) 
 
2.30085 
(0.1021) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Debt/GDP 
does not Granger Cause Capital 
Expenditure/GDP 
 
 
0.46977 
(0.6254) 
 
0.00561 
(0.9944) 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: Real Capital 
Expenditure does not Granger 
Cause Real Debt 
 
 
6.18080 
(0.0000) 
 
15.1377 
(0.0000) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Real Debt does 
not Granger Cause Real Capital 
Expenditure 
 
 
3.82761 
(0.0005) 
 
9.7320 
(0.0000) 
 
Table 7b. Granger Causality Test (GIIPS) Panel. 
 
Panel Data (GIIPS) F-statistic 
(1980-2013) 
F-statistic 
(1993-2013) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Capital 
Expenditure/GDP does not 
Granger Cause Debt/GDP 
 
 
10.0059 
(0.0019) 
 
2.29256 
(0.1068) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Debt/GDP 
does not Granger Cause Capital 
Expenditure/GDP 
 
 
0.01901
 
(0.8905) 
 
0.20935 
(0.8815) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Real Capital 
Expenditure does not Granger 
Cause Real Debt 
 
 
17.5153 
(0.0000) 
 
7.83929 
(0.0007) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Real Debt does 
not Granger Cause Real Capital 
Expenditure 
 
 
3.05578 
(0.0823) 
 
1.05138 
(0.3537) 
 
Note: 
 
p-values in brackets. 
 
